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Information and Quality When Motivation is Intrinsic: 
Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards†
By Jonathan T. Kolstad*
If profit maximization is the objective of a firm, new information 
about quality should affect firm behavior only through its effects 
on market demand. I consider an alternate model in which suppli-
ers are motivated by a desire to perform well in addition to profit. 
The introduction of quality “report cards” for cardiac surgery in 
Pennsylvania provides an empirical setting to isolate the relative role 
of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in determining surgeon response. 
Information on performance that was new to surgeons and unrelated 
to patient demand led to an intrinsic response four times larger than 
surgeon response to profit incentives. (JEL D83, I11, L15)
A defining feature of health care markets is imperfect information (Arrow 1963). 
Standard models show that in settings where consumers are poorly informed about 
product quality there are welfare losses due to the less-than-optimal supply of costly 
quality (Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992) or the absence of markets for products 
and services that consumers otherwise value (Akerlof 1970). Losses generally stem 
from profit maximizing suppliers who are able to profit from information to which 
they are privy, but cannot be obtained (or verified) by the demand side (e.g., Arrow 
1963; Gaynor 2006; Salop and Stiglitz 1977). Consequently, policies to correct mar-
ket failures due to asymmetric quality information focus on demand. In health care 
markets, where quality is widely believed to be suboptimal, this is the rationale for 
efforts to gather performance information, such as mortality, and offer it directly to 
consumers. The existing evidence on such quality reporting in health care,  however, 
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generally finds improvements in measured quality, but little evidence for corre-
sponding changes in consumer demand (Epstein 2006; Steinbrook 2006).
To better explain the observed behavior of surgeons facing public quality report-
ing and to explore the nature of incentives among firms and individuals receiving 
public ratings, I consider the role of information in determining market outcomes 
when suppliers also have non-pecuniary incentives. I use the term “intrinsic motiva-
tion” to refer to incentives unrelated to profit and model it as a function not only 
of quality itself but of the ability to observably perform well relative to a reference 
group. In this context, information enters profit motives and alters intrinsic incen-
tives when collecting and disseminating information provides the individual with a 
better sense of his or her own quality compared to peers.
The empirical setting for this study is the introduction of quality “report cards” 
for surgeons performing Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgery in 
Pennsylvania. Utilizing a detailed panel of data on surgeons and patients, I explore 
the effects of quality report card release on subsequent surgeon performance. 
Exploiting the information contained in the report card’s risk adjustment scheme, I 
model surgeons’ prior and posterior beliefs about market quality levels (both their 
own and that of their peers). I find an impact of this information on changes in 
surgeon quality but not on demand—evidence for the presence of non-pecuniary 
incentives resulting from quality reporting.
To incorporate profit incentives, I estimate a structural model of consumer demand 
for surgeons. Consumer utility is modeled as a function of the detailed set of indi-
vidual patient and surgeon observables. In addition, I account for unobserved (to 
the econometrician) influences on choice, including the role of physician agency, 
using a random coefficients demand model (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; 
Train 2003). Simulations, relying on the estimated demand parameters, produce a 
measure of the additional market rewards for quality due to reporting. Variation in 
the ex ante distribution of patient demand for quality and the competitive structure 
of the markets leads to large differences in extrinsic incentives between surgeons. 
Individuals facing stronger profit incentives following the release of quality report 
cards show greater improvements in performance. This effect, however, is relatively 
small. Extrinsic incentives led to an additional 3 percent decline in the statewide 
risk adjusted mortality rate (RAMR) between the pre- and post-report card periods. 
Incorporating estimates of the intrinsic response to information predicts changes 
in surgeon quality that accords well with the observed response to reporting. The 
intrinsic response to quality reporting is about four times as large as the response 
due to profit incentives induced by changes in demand for quality. Quality improve-
ments cannot be explained by changes in underlying patient severity, either based 
on observables used in the risk adjustment scheme or “unused” observables col-
lected, but not included in risk adjustment. There is evidence for selection efforts on 
“unused” observables. However, the impact of these severity measures on outcomes 
are far smaller than those included in the risk adjustment. Further sensitivity analy-
sis finds that the observed intrinsic response cannot be explained by dynamic pecu-
niary incentives—either in volume or mix of insurance payers—or inter-temporal 
technological change.
This paper contributes to the debate in economics on the merit of reporting 
schemes. Quality reporting and disclosure policies have been implemented across a 
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variety of industries to address a multitude of market failures (Chatterji and Toffel 
2007). Reviewing the evidence, Fung, Graham, and Weil (2007) find the welfare 
impact of information-based policy interventions varies dramatically depending 
on the market and regulatory environment. Their assessment, however, appraises 
disclosure through the lens of the standard profit-maximizing model. The same 
approach also underlies much of the evaluation of reporting for CABG surgery. 
Despite finding that additional quality improvement followed the introduction of 
reporting programs (Epstein 2006; Ghali et al. 1997; Peterson et al. 1998; Hannan 
et al. 2003), the debate on and analysis of reporting efforts has focused on consum-
ers’ ability to interpret and respond to the information supplied. If quality report 
cards deliver information on and to suppliers who care about performance intrinsi-
cally, then their impact (both positive and normative) is not solely mediated through 
changes in demand.
Decisions about the value and type of quality information that should be mea-
sured and publicly reported depend critically on the model of supplier behavior. If 
suppliers operate under a standard profit model, demand side incentives can pro-
duce quality improvements. On the other hand, to the extent that information about 
peers alters surgeons’ intrinsic incentives, public release is of less relevance. In fact, 
contrary to current efforts to simplify provider report cards, it may be preferable to 
deliver data with more clinical detail.
This paper also contributes to a broad literature in economics on information 
and incentives. Work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics has 
demonstrated a potential role for reference-based utility in individual behavior 
and incentives (Fehr and Schmidt 2006; Heffetz and Frank 2011). To date, how-
ever, relatively few empirical studies have documented such incentives in practice 
(Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2005; Sauermann and Cohen 2008). This is due in 
part to the difficulty of empirically identifying changes in information in a market. 
The CABG setting allows me to overcome this problem by observing an exogenous 
and measurable change—the release of quality report cards.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops a model of quality choice with 
intrinsic motivation. Section II discusses the data and setting. Section III presents 
the econometric specifications and results. Section IV provides discussion and 
Section V concludes. 
I. A Model of Surgeon Objectives with Uncertainty
I begin by considering a model of the equilibrium quality choices of surgeons 
who gain utility from income (profit) and from performing well. Because quality 
is also valued independently of earnings, surgeons are willing to forgo some profit 
to enhance quality. This willingness is a function of the ability to observe perfor-
mance—determined by the information structure of the market. The intuition of the 
model is that a surgeon with little information on his own performance, and that of 
his peers, is unable to accurately observe both static levels of quality and improve-
ments. In this way, increased uncertainty dilutes the intrinsic incentive for quality 
improvement because surgeons do not see the result of effort or may believe, in the 
absence of information, that they are performing as well as they should be. This 
information also impacts surgeon incentives through the standard channel—quality 
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information informs consumers and, subsequently, determines quality elasticity of 
demand and the profitability of quality improvement.
Consider the quality choice of a surgeon in a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket with regulated prices above the marginal cost of production. Prices are fixed at 
a regulated level,  p reg , and surgeons maximize utility by selecting a quality level 
subject to a convex production technology, c( θ i ,  q i ). To incorporate preferences that 
include both profit and intrinsic incentives, I express supplier utility as
(1)   U i =  Π i ( θ i ,  θ −i , Ω) +  Γ i ( θ i ,  θ j , Ω).
Allowing profit and intrinsic utility from quality to enter as additively separable 
terms can incorporate a range of intrinsic preferences and is a common feature of 
models of physician behavior (Fehr and Schmidt 2006; Harsanyi 1955; McGuire 
2000; Segal and Sobel 2007). The term  Γ i ( θ i ,  θ j , Ω) captures individual i’s intrin-
sic utility from quality relative to the reference group j ∈ J.1 Firm demand, 
 q i ( θ i ,  θ −i , Ω), is determined by the quality of surgeon i as well as the quality choices 
of all competing surgeons. The reference group J is not necessarily the same as the 
set of all competing surgeons, indexed by −i. Information in the market is captured 
by the variable Ω, the effect of which I return to below. Surgeon i solves the follow-
ing problem:
(2)   max 
 θ i 
  U i =  Π i ( θ i ,  θ −i , Ω) +  Γ i ( θ i ,  θ j , Ω) 
 =  q i ( θ i ,  θ −i | Ω)  p reg − c ( θ i ,  q i ) +  Γ i ( θ i ,  θ j | Ω).
The argument that maximizes (2) (optimum quality) is reached when
(3)   ( ∂  q i ( θ i ,  θ −i * | Ω)/∂  θ i )  p reg + ∂ Γ i ( θ i ,  θ j * | Ω)/∂  θ i = ∂ c ( θ i ,  θ j * )/∂  θ i ,
where all partial derivatives are taken with respect to own quality, taking the best 
response of other surgeons as given. The optimum is simply the point at which the 
sum of the marginal revenue (determined by the price and demand elasticity of qual-
ity) and marginal intrinsic utility is equal to the marginal cost of quality.2 Implicitly 
differentiating (3), optimal quality increases in demand for quality (determined 
jointly by consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality and their ability to observe it) 
and intrinsic utility from quality improvement. Quality declines with the marginal 
cost of quality. In the standard model (where a surgeon cares only about pecuniary 
rewards) ∂ Γ i ( θ i ,  θ j * | Ω)/∂  θ i = 0 and the equilibrium condition is reduced to setting 
1 Intrinsic motivation has a strict definition in the psychology literature: utility from the activity must be derived 
from a stimulus within the individual (Sauermann and Cohen 2008 provide a useful synopsis). The model here cap-
tures intrinsic incentives under this definition as well as in a more general sense (typically used by economists). It 
fits a strict interpretation of intrinsic utility if reference utility is derived internally but, due to uncertainty, is altered 
by the outside information. However, if surgeons care directly about a ranking that is provided by the report card 
this is (strictly speaking) an extrinsic motive because it is initiated by an outside stimulus. For simplicity, in this 
paper I refer to all non-pecuniary rewards as intrinsic though I acknowledge this may not adhere to convention in 
some fields.
2 One could also move the marginal intrinsic incentive in equation (3) to the right hand side. In this case the 
intrinsic incentive enters as a “reduction” in marginal cost. This interpretation is developed by Gaynor (2006) to 
model supplier quality choice with not-for-profit incentives.
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marginal cost equal to marginal revenue.3 Equilibrium quality is an increasing func-
tion of the residual elasticity of demand for quality.
I also assume that a surgeon determines his or her own quality relative to a refer-
ence group  ˜  θ j ∈ ( θ _ j ,  _ θ j ). Intrinsic utility from quality is captured in the model as a 
function that maps the deviation between an individual’s quality and their reference 
point to a change in utility:  Γ i( θ i * −  ˜ θ j ). The precise relationship depends on the 
reference group and the shape of the intrinsic loss function.
The information structure of the market captures the impact of quality reporting in 
the model. Information in period t is indexed by the set  Ω t ∈ {μ, ε} containing two 
elements. The first term, μ, captures information on the relative location of a surgeon 
in the distribution. The second term, ε, measures the “quality” of information or the 
precision of a surgeon’s beliefs about the distribution of reference qualities.4 From 
equation (1) and the first-order condition in (3), it is clear that changes to the infor-
mation structure can alter both components of surgeon utility. First, improved infor-
mation allows consumers to more easily observe the quality of their full choice set 
of surgeons. This change in demand alters the pecuniary returns to quality improve-
ment. Second, a better signal provides surgeons with more precise information on 
the performance of the set J in the reference group. Improved knowledge about the 
reference group alters the shape of the intrinsic utility function because changes in 
performance are more easily measured and produce utility gains.
Figures 1 and 2 present a graphical example. In Figure 1, each surgeon has a con-
vex marginal cost curve (labeled MC) and a marginal revenue curve that is increas-
ing in quality (labeled MR). In this standard model a surgeon is solely extrinsically 
motivated. He selects the point at which the marginal cost of quality improvement 
equals the marginal pecuniary benefit (MR). Introducing information on perfor-
mance alters quality by changing the slope of the marginal revenue from improving 
quality. This can be seen in the rotation from MR0 to MR1. Quality reporting leads 
to improvement in performance from  θ * to  θ ** by altering demand for quality and, 
thus, the pecuniary reward.
Figure 2 introduces a mixed surgeon utility function. Panel A contains two possi-
ble intrinsic utility functions. Two surgeons (labeled 1 and 2) have the same concave 
intrinsic utility function, but compare themselves to the lowest and highest surgeon 
in their reference set respectively.5 The deviation between profit and utility maxi-
mizing quality, visible in panel B of Figure 2, is determined by the shape of the MC, 
MR, and MB curves. For any monotonically increasing intrinsic utility function the 
marginal benefit curve (MB) is higher than MR. Graphically, this is captured in the 
3 Because prices are set by a regulator (Medicare), demand is equal to marginal revenue provided quality elastic-
ity of demand is not a function of patient cost (i.e., raising quality does not lead to differential increases in demand 
from the most severe patients). I assume payments are sufficient to make marginal patients profitable. In cardiac sur-
gery this condition is likely to hold. Huckman (2006) finds that cardiac surgical Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) 
are profitable on average and at the margin. Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon (2001) also find evidence that 
reimbursement for cardiac surgery is greater than cost (though the degree of profitability varies by payer).
4 In a general model, surgeons are Bayesian learners and new information induces a posterior distribution of 
reference quality. Updating alters both mean beliefs about relative quality and the precision of the posterior.
5 Note that the curve for surgeon 2 is convex as presented due to the reference point. Utility, however, is still 
concave in that returns are diminishing for changes further from the reference quality, the “best” surgeon.
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increase in equilibrium quality from  θ ** to θ′ or θ″, depending on surgeon’s intrinsic 
utility function and reference point.6
Prior to quality reporting, without information on peers, any change in quality is 
indistinguishable from noise. In panel A of Figure 2, this is the flat intrinsic utility 
function Γ( θ i −  θ _ |  Ω 0 ). Without information, improving quality does not increase 
utility because it cannot be observed. Utility from quality need not, however, be set 
at zero if surgeons gain some level of static intrinsic utility—the “warm glow” from 
being a cardiac surgeon.
After report cards are released, new information is provided with the signal 
Ω 1 ∈ { μ″, ε″ }. Information that alters a surgeon’s perceived relative quality changes 
his utility either positively or negatively (e.g., they learn they are better or worse 
than expected). Marginal incentives are also altered by the quality of the signal and 
the ensuing shape of the utility function. In this case, because there was no informa-
tion prior to quality reporting, the prior slope of intrinsic utility is zero so any signal 
that provides new information will unambiguously increase the slope of the intrin-
sic utility curve resulting in increased intrinsic incentives for all physicians.7 This 
6 In Figure 2, equilibrium quality is relatively high even for a profit maximizing supplier so for surgeon 1 (where 
the reference point is defined by the lowest quality in the group) intrinsic incentives increase quality to θ′, a small 
effect. On the other hand, for surgeon 2, who aspires to be “the best,” intrinsic incentives are relatively strong, lead-
ing to an equilibrium quality choice of θ″.
7 This also underscores the fact that for any intrinsic utility function unrelated to information, quality reporting 
should not alter non-pecuniary incentives for quality. Even if surgeons are purely altruistic and perfect agents for 
patients, quality reporting would not alter quality levels unless information enters utility (the argument parallels 
perfect agency in Ellis and McGuire 1986). For example, not-for-profit providers are assumed to more accurately 
reflect social preferences in their strategies but, in general, models have not considered the knowledge they have 
about quality and how this impacts their incentives (Arrow 1963; Newhouse 1970; Sloan 2000).
MC
MR1 
MR0
θ* θ** θ
$
Figure 1. Profit Maximizing Quality Choice
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need not be true, however. If surgeons have some information on the distribution 
of reference quality prior to formal reporting then the slope of the intrinsic utility 
function will not initially be zero and some surgeons can receive new information 
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Figure 2. Intrinsic Utility and Quality Choice
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that diminishes or leaves incentives unchanged. Rather than make explicit assump-
tions about priors that would allow unambiguous predictions, I note the potential 
for quality reporting to either increase or decrease intrinsic incentives and allow for 
both effects empirically.8
A measure of extrinsic and intrinsic utility can also be computed in this frame-
work. In Figure 2, the area below the marginal cost curve between A and B and 
above the marginal revenue curve between A and C measures the additional cost in 
excess of revenue a surgeon is willing to expend in order to improve performance 
solely to gain intrinsic utility.9 That is, for every quality investment beyond  θ ** a sur-
geon loses money at the margin. Willingness to undertake such investments captures 
a non-pecuniary incentive in the utility function related to costly quality.
The primary goal of the remainder of the paper is to measure empirically the 
relative contribution of each of these incentive components in determining surgeon 
response to quality reporting in Pennsylvania. Viewed in Figure 2, this effort reduces 
to decomposing the observed quality improvement from  θ * to θ″ into the share due 
to the move from MR0 to MR1, and the share due to changes in intrinsic incentives 
from Γ( θ i −  _ θ |  Ω 0 ) to Γ( θ i −  _ θ |  Ω 1 ). Decomposing quality change in this manner is 
testing the predictions of the model that suppliers imperfectly observe quality, that 
they care about this quality independently of pecuniary rewards, and that they gain 
new information from the release of quality report cards.
II. Background and Setting
A. Quality Reporting in Health Care
Quality reporting programs have been implemented in many forms across a vari-
ety of markets for health insurance and for providers (see Kolstad and Chernew 
2009 for a review of the evidence to date). As of 2006, 47 states had some form of 
quality reporting system in place for health care providers (37 are mandatory and 10 
are voluntary) (Steinbrook 2006). The most studied within the provider context have 
been the CABG report card programs in New York and Pennsylvania.10 Reporting 
of surgeon and hospitals’ risk-adjusted mortality rate (RAMR) for CABG began 
in 1989 in New York State. Pennsylvania’s experiment followed shortly thereafter 
and was led by the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4), a 
public/private partnership. They began collecting discharge data on outcomes and 
patient comorbidities in 1990. The first widely available report card was released in 
May of 1998 and included data from 1994–1995.11
8 To make more explicit predictions in this setting would require me to define a set of beliefs for a given surgeon 
as well as the form of the signal being provided by the report card. The assumptions required would be very strong 
and could basically determine any set of outcomes based on those assumptions. Miller (2006) demonstrates the 
challenge posed by distributional assumptions on the form of competition in modeling provider response to quality 
reporting, though without incorporating intrinsic incentives.
9 For any cost function and demand curve the dollar value of intrinsic utility is  ∫ 
 θ **  
 θ ″ 
 MC(θ) d θ −  ∫ 
 θ **  
 θ ″ 
 MR(θ) d θ.
10 Similar report card programs for cardiac surgery are now in use in many states including California, 
Massachusetts, Florida, and New Jersey as well as at the country level in the United Kingdom (Steinbrook 2006).
11 Reports based on 1990–1993 data were constructed and released between 1992 and 1995. However, these 
reports are no longer available and discussions with experts suggest that these data and the reports were not widely 
distributed. Furthermore, the risk-adjustment measures differed from later reports.
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Some of the earliest evidence on these policies comes from surveys of market par-
ticipants and case studies. The former suggest that quality reporting did not signifi-
cantly alter consumer choice (Schneider and Epstein 1998; Hannan et al. 1994).12 
Dziuban et al. (1994) present a case study of the response of a large community 
teaching hospital to New York State’s release of quality report cards. This description 
is particularly relevant as that experience maps very closely both to the theory devel-
oped in this study and to the empirical implementation that relies on risk adjustment 
as a measure of new information provided to surgeons. The hospital had compre-
hensive data capture and case review practices in place prior to quality reporting in 
order to improve performance. Despite this, new information was provided from the 
report card due to learning that their patient population was less severe than expected 
and, thus, their actual quality was low, despite their observed mortality rate. This 
new information led to a detailed analysis and practice changes that resulted in sub-
sequent quality improvements (reductions in RAMR). Studies that rely on observed 
consumer behavior find more evidence for an effect of quality reporting on aggre-
gate market share, though the effects remain relatively small (Cutler, Huckman, and 
Landrum 2004; Dranove and Sfekas 2008; Mukamel and Mushlin 1998).
Another line of research on supplier response to quality reporting has focused on 
selection against sicker patients. In their survey, Schneider and Epstein (1998) found 
that 63 percent of surgeons report reduced willingness to operate on severe patients 
and 59 percent of cardiologists report having difficulty finding a surgeon for their 
more severe patients. Dranove et al. (2003) compare outcomes for cardiac patients 
in the Medicare population in New York and Pennsylvania with those in locations 
without report cards. They find patients had better matches with providers—a gain 
from the release of information—as well as selection by surgeons against sicker 
patients, higher resources use, and worse outcomes.13 Fong (2008) considers similar 
selection behavior in a theoretical setting. While this paper does not bear on the exis-
tence of such effects, her findings underscore the important role supplier objectives 
should play in determining optimal policy.
Survey evidence and, to a slightly lesser extent, revealed preference suggest little 
demand response. On the other hand, a review of the medical literature finds, “ … there is 
evidence that the public disclosure of death rates associated with surgery in New York and 
other states has contributed to reductions in operative mortality … ” (Steinbrook 2006, 
p. 1848). Applying the mixed incentive model in this paper can explain these findings.
B. CABG Surgery
CABG surgery is one of a range of possible treatments for coronary artery disease, 
a condition in which a patient’s blood flow to the heart is compromised by narrow-
ing of the coronary arteries. The severity and symptoms of the disease vary with the 
degree of obstruction. Cardiac catheterization, a process that allows a cardiologist 
to image the blockage(s), is used to assess the extent of the disease and determine 
12 The introduction of quality reporting was highly contentious in New York and Pennsylvania (Bumiller 1995). 
To the extent that surgeons or cardiologists had an opinion on the topic, there is a concern that their answers 
reflected their preference for or against quality reporting.
13 The aggregate welfare effect of report cards during their study period was negative.
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the appropriate treatment regime. Patients can be managed medically using drugs 
(beta-blockers, aspirin, ACE inhibitors, etc.) or surgically with either percutaneous 
transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) or CABG. If a surgical intervention is 
decided upon, the patient must then choose between angioplasty and CABG and 
select a cardiac surgeon. All of these choices depend not only on patient characteris-
tics but also on the incentives facing their agent in the choice, the cardiologist (e.g., 
Afendulis and Kessler 2007).
Cardiac bypass surgery is the most invasive treatment for cardiovascular disease. 
After opening the chest wall, the surgeon creates a bypass around the blocked coro-
nary artery using either internal mammary arteries or arteries from the leg. The pro-
duction function is complex and determined not only by the attending surgeon, but 
also by a team of physicians and support staff (Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano 
2001). The physicians required for a CABG procedure include a cardiac anesthesiol-
ogist and the operating surgeon. In addition, a perfusionist, nursing, and other support 
staff play an important role in the procedure itself and the follow up care as the patient 
recovers. A widely documented effect in this market is the presence of a volume-
outcome relationship. This is generally attributed to  learning-by-doing, though the 
endogeneity of volume raises the alternate mechanism of selective referral (Arrow 
1963; Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town 2006; Gaynor 2006; Ramanarayanan 2008).
The model developed thus far has focused on the surgeon as the unit of analysis, 
not the hospital. This reflects the fact that, with a few specific exceptions, surgeons 
are not employed by the hospitals at which they perform surgery. Rather hospitals 
provide a space for surgeons to perform CABG as well as the necessary support staff 
and resources. The surgeons themselves act as freelance workers and gain profits 
directly from providing additional services (Cutler, Huckman, and Kolstad 2010). 
Underscoring the freelance nature of the relationship, many surgeons have privileges 
to perform CABG surgery across different hospitals at the same time (Huckman and 
Pisano 2006). The hospital and surgeon are compensated separately with a fee for 
the different services provided by each. The fee-for-service (FFS) compensation for 
CABG makes it one of the most profitable types of care for Medicare enrollees and 
most types of private insurance (Huckman 2006; Chernew, Scanlon, and Hayward 
1998). Because reimbursement is above cost—both on average and at the margin—
and payments are made directly to surgeons for each surgery, the quantity of proce-
dures provided is a direct measure of profit.
C. Data
Data were obtained from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 
(PHC4) and contain observations for 89,406 CABG surgeries performed in the state 
of Pennsylvania in 1994–1995, 2000, and 2002–2003 (PHC4, 1998, 2002, 2004, 
2005). Each observation includes information on the surgeon performing the sur-
gery, the hospital at which the surgery was performed, patient demographics, a set of 
patient comorbidities, the patient’s home zip code, data on the payer type, and a set 
of outcome variables.14 The outcome of interest in this paper is inpatient  mortality. 
14 Patient characteristics include age, indicators for cardiogenic shock, concurrent angioplasty, complicated 
hypertension, dialysis, female gender, heart failure, and prior CABG or valve surgery.
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In addition, I merge data on surgeon tenure in the Pennsylvania market.15 This is 
intended to capture the life-cycle nature of returns to quality as well as costs that are 
associated with age of the surgeon. To account for the fact that academic surgeons 
may differ in their incentives, I also gather data on the number of publications for 
each surgeon by 1995 and the number of citations to those publications.
I compute a measure of risk adjusted mortality to capture surgeon performance 
using the standard approach used by PHC4. Each observation includes a dummy 
variable equal to one if a patient died in the hospital during or immediately follow-
ing surgery. The log probability of death is computed as follows:
(4)  ln  ( Pr (MOR T i , s, h = 1 |  x i )   __  1 − Pr (MOR T i , s, h = 1 |  x i ) ) =  β 0 +  β 1 ∙  X i +  ε i , s, h ,
where i indexes patient, s surgeon, and h hospital. MORT is the indicator variable 
that equals one if the patient died in the hospital. This model is estimated for each 
report card period (1994–1995, 2000, 2002, and 2003).16 The fitted values are 
obtained for each patient to form a predicted probability of death—the Expected 
Mortality Rate (EMR). For each surgeon, I then compute a measure of risk adjusted 
performance (RAMR):
(5)  RAM R s, h =  ( OM R s, h  _ EM R s, h  ) OM R PA ,
where the risk adjusted, expected, and observed mortality rates for each surgeon s 
or hospital h are RAMR, EMR, and OMR respectively. Risk adjustment is accom-
plished by dividing the actual number of fatalities by the expected number of deaths 
conditioning on the actual patients selecting surgeon s or hospital h. This ratio is 
then normalized by multiplying it by the statewide average mortality rate.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for key variables in the data. As angioplasty 
gains market share, substituting for CABG, the statewide volume declines (this also 
occurred in neighboring states, see Cutler, Huckman, and Kolstad 2010). The per-
formance improvement over time is also apparent in the reductions in the mean 
RAMR. Between 1994 and 2003 the mean surgeon RAMR dropped 42 percent from 
a rate of 3.42 percent to 2 percent. Figure 3 plots quarterly mean RAMR and unad-
justed mortality highlighting the drop following the release of quality report cards 
in 1998. Comparing performance in 1994–1995 to the period between 2000 and the 
second quarter of 2002 (quarters 24 to 33 in the graph) shows a decline in quarterly 
average RAMR and OMR, though these results are noisy from quarter to quarter.
Table 2 presents a matrix of transition probabilities between quintile measures 
of surgeon quality (5 indexes the highest quality and 1 the lowest in each period) 
in 1995 and 2000. The evidence suggests that it is feasible for surgeons to improve 
performance regardless of baseline quality. Of the worst performing surgeons in 
15 This is computed based on the date the surgeon was first licensed in the state. These data are gathered by 
matching surgeon names with the state database of license information available at http://www.dos.state.pa.us/
bpoa/cwp/view.asp?a=1104&q=432785.
16 The coefficient estimates and marginal effects for this regression for the 1994–1995 and year 2000 data are 
presented in Appendix A1.
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1995, 13 percent were in the top 20 percent in 2000, while 8 percent remained in 
the lowest performing group. Surgeons in the third quintile of performance in 1995 
were equally likely to be in the highest quality as the lowest quality quintile by 
2000 (16 percent in both cases). Transition probabilities are computed using the full 
sample of surgeons. Looking at the right most column of Table 2 it is also clear that 
exit is substantial, particularly in the highest and lowest quality (quintiles 5 and 1 
respectively). For this reason subsequent analyses are limited to surgeons observed 
in both the pre- and post-reporting period.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics by Year
Year Observations Surgeons Hospitals Mean RAMR† Mean OMR†
1994–1995 18,351 201 43 3.42 3.23
2000 19,594 182 55 2.38 2.20
2002 15,999 187 62 2.02 1.82
2003 15,157 183 63 2.00 1.85
Note: † Surgeon weighted average.
Table 2—Transition Matrix for RAMR Quintile Between 1995 and 2000
2000 RAMR Quintile
1995 RAMR Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Exit
1 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.63
2 0.08 0.24 0.26 0.16 0.08 0.18
3 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.16 0.16
4 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.34
5 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.46
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III. Econometric Models and Results
A. Identifying Intrinsic Incentives Using Information
To measure the effect of new information on surgeon choices due to intrinsic 
incentives, I construct an estimate for the new information provided by quality 
reporting that was available only to surgeons, but not observed by consumers. The 
empirical question is whether surgeons who receive new information that is unre-
lated to demand differ in their subsequent quality improvement.
To construct the information measures I assume that, in the absence of data, a 
surgeon forms beliefs about performance by observing successes and failures—his 
or her own inpatient mortality rate. Surgeons do not, however, know with great 
certainty whether a patient is likely to have died given their underlying severity and 
the latest techniques and technologies.17 The introduction of risk adjustment pro-
vides this information by giving surgeons the “true” difficulty of their cases—the 
expected outcome had the average surgeon in the state handled the case. The degree 
to which this confirms or differs from surgeons’ priors is a measure of the amount of 
new information contained in the report for each surgeon.
I approximate this empirically as a nonlinear function of the difference between 
a surgeon’s mean pre-report card RAMR and OMR: f (RAM R pre − OM R pre ). A sur-
geon with a larger difference between his RAMR and his observed mortality, regard-
less of the level of each, is provided more new information by the introduction of 
quality reporting. Figure 4 presents a histogram of the frequency of this measure. 
Information contained in the risk-adjustment appears to be roughly normally distrib-
uted around zero, with a substantial share of surgeons who have a RAMR that differs 
from their OMR.
Viewed through the lens of the theory in Section I, this measure of information 
corresponds to a specific case in which surgeons care intrinsically about performing 
as well as possible given the average level of skill and technology in the market. 
More generally, this measure captures the magnitude of new information that might 
induce effort due to a comparison with many possible reference groups (e.g., very 
high quality surgeons for those learning they are doing very well and just getting to 
be average for those learning they are not doing as well). The intuition of the model 
holds in these cases, though the empirical expression allows the response to vary 
for good and bad news of different magnitudes without explicitly testing the precise 
reference group. I return to this issue with some sensitivity analysis in Section IVD 
which allows local peers to differentially impact effort.
I begin the analysis by plotting the difference between surgeon RAMR and OMR for 
1994–1995 against both the percentage change in surgeon volume from 1995 to 2000 
and the percentage change in RAMR over the same period. These results are presented 
in Figure 5. I fit the data using a Kernel-weighted local  polynomial smoother (Fan 
and Gijbels 1996) to estimate a nonparametric surgeon response to new information.
17 It is plausible physicians may have an indication of a given patient’s severity. However, the evidence on physi-
cian difficulty in assessing probabilities, the dynamics of new technologies and techniques, and physician reliance 
on rules of thumb in treatment choices suggests that the objective measure of risk adjustment would provide new 
information relative to their existing assessments of patient severity (e.g., Frank and Zeckhauser 2007). Dziuban 
et al. (1994) present a case study of precisely this mechanism in response to New York State’s quality report cards.
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The lower curve plots the relationship of the difference between surgeon RAMR 
and OMR in 1994–1995, and the change in surgeon volume between 1995 and 
2000. The curve is remarkably flat, suggesting that this measure of new information 
did not lead to large changes in demand.18 The upper curve in Figure 5 plots the 
same information measure against surgeons’ change in RAMR  following reporting 
18 Formalizing this plot as a regression, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the five quartiles of the distribution of 
RAMR-OMR had the same change in volume between 1995 and 2000.
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 (computed by taking the difference relative to 1995 levels so positive values repre-
sent quality improvement). The curve is u-shaped centered near zero. These results 
suggest that RAMR remained roughly the same between 1995 and 2000 for surgeons 
receiving no new information. Moving away from zero in either direction, we see 
that increased information led to larger improvements in quality.
The effect increases monotonically in each direction over most informa-
tion ranges. Enhanced incentives for surgeons whose performance was worse 
than expected (RAMR > OMR) fits easily into the model described in Section I. 
Performance improvement among surgeons learning they were at higher than 
expected quality is inconsistent with standard models of incentives, but accords 
with intrinsic incentives that are affected by quality information. If the shape of 
the intrinsic utility function is such that the posterior slope is greater than the 
prior, then improved information can enhance incentives, regardless of the sign of 
the change.19 An example of this type of effect is a surgeon who desires to be the 
best. Learning that he is better than expected and closer to his objective increases 
the incentive to improve.
To implement this identification strategy in a testable model requires additional 
parametric assumptions. I saturate the model by separating the magnitude of new 
information into quintiles of the difference between RAMR and OMR, indexed by 
n. Surgeons in the bottom two quintiles (groups 1 and 2) receive information that 
they are worse than they thought they were (i.e., RAMR is higher than their OMR). 
Surgeons in the middle quintile (percentiles 40 to 59 of the distribution and the 
omitted category in estimation) receive no new information (RAMR roughly equal 
to OMR) and the surgeons in the top two quintiles (groups 4 and 5) receive new 
information that suggests they are better than expected. It is possible that surgeons 
whose RAMR is similar to their OMR also learn from the introduction of report 
cards. To the extent this is true, we expect some response from quintile three if they 
are intrinsically motivated. In this case the estimated effect of intrinsic incentives is 
a lower bound.20 Using this measure of information, the primary estimating equa-
tion is as follows:
(6) Δ θ s = α + λΔ Π s +  ξ n  ∑ 
n=1
5
  I n, s (RAM R pre − OM R pre ) +  X s +  X h +  ε s, h ,
where the dependent variable is the change in surgeon quality (RAMR) between the 
pre- and post-reporting periods.  X s is a set of surgeon level observables,  X h is a set of 
hospital level controls, and  ε s is an i.i.d., mean zero error term. If information alters 
quality due to intrinsic incentives, additional data from report cards should produce 
performance improvement. The hypothesis  H 0 :  ξ n =  ξ 3 is a test for intrinsic incen-
tives associated with the information contained in each group n. With quality as the 
dependent variable, changes in profit incentives due to quality reporting also enter 
the model, captured by Δ Π s . Estimating (6) thus requires constructing a measure of 
19 While I do not formally rely on this as a test, responding to information that performance is better than expected 
by improving performance is inconsistent with the behavior predicted by a standard model of profit maximization.
20 Another reasonable possibility is that higher performing surgeons have a better idea of their underlying patient 
severity than those at the bottom of the distribution. In this case it is also true that the estimated impact for groups 1 
and 2 will be biased downwards. I thank an anonymous referee for this helpful extension.
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the change in extrinsic incentives (the relative slope of MR in Figure 1) induced by 
quality reporting. This is the focus of the next section of the paper.
One important concern in estimating (6) is the potential for mean reversion that 
could bias the estimated effect of both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives on changes 
in surgeon quality. To account for this possibility, I include a surgeon’s average 
RAMR in 1994–1995 in the vector  X s . This eliminates mean reversion in the esti-
mated effect of information and controls for the mechanical relationship between a 
surgeon’s baseline quality and the implied returns to quality improvement.21 Despite 
these empirical advantages, I also present results without the pre-reporting RAMR 
because any correlation between RAMR and the intrinsic information measure will 
bias the  ξ n coefficients toward zero.
Finally, technological change over time could affect the model. I account for this 
in two ways. First, risk adjustment is computed for each period and, subsequently, 
incorporates changes in the average ability to treat a patient with a given comorbid-
ity. That is, a surgeon’s risk adjusted performance in period t is defined in terms of 
the expected mortality conditional on patient covariates given the current period 
technology. This controls for the majority of inter-temporal improvement in tech-
nology. A second concern is that technological change alters quality due to unob-
served factors uncorrelated with the risk adjusters. I assume that this effect is equal 
across the panel of surgeons, conditional on surgeon and market observables. Under 
this assumption, the intercept α captures any additional unobserved technological 
change. Furthermore, specifications that include a surgeon’s baseline RAMR allow 
the impact of technology to enter flexibly across the ex ante quality distribution. If, 
for example, a new technique or device were introduced that is more effective for 
lower performing surgeons (or they adopt this later than surgeons observed to be 
high quality) it is captured in the relationship between mean 1994–1995 RAMR and 
changes in quality.
B. Surgeon Quality and Patient Demand
In order to more precisely relate demand side factors to surgeon quality choices 
following reporting, I estimate a structural model of consumer demand. Relying 
on parameter estimates for patients’ utility, I can simulate alternate information 
environments. I model patients’ discrete selection of a surgeon allowing for factors 
that are unobserved (to the econometrician) but alter choice. These enter as random 
coefficients. (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2000; Train 2003). I present 
a brief discussion of the key variables and refer the reader to Kolstad (2012) for a 
detailed description of the structural model.
Each patient selects from the set of surgeons in his or her Hospital Referral Region 
(HRR). The utility for patient i from choosing a given surgeon s is a function of 
21 I also note that, even in the absence of 1994–1995 RAMR control, if I have accurate measures of quality, con-
cerns about mean reversion will be minimized (i.e., the error term on the estimated quality in each period is small 
relative to the treatment effect). Because I have observations from a relatively long pre- and post-period (I observe 
an average of 240 surgeries per surgeon in the pre- and 160 in the post-reporting period), I expect the variance in 
estimated quality in each period to be small relative to the magnitude of the effect I am trying to identify (RAMR 
change).
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travel cost, expected health improvement (capturing all components of quality), and 
an error term. Indirect utility to consumer i who selects surgeon s is
(7)   u i , s, h = g ( X i ,  η i ,  Z s, h ,  θ s, h ; ρ) +  ε i , s, h ,
where  X i and  η i are vectors of observed and unobserved patient characteristics all of 
which lead to differences in taste.  Z s, h is a K-dimensional vector of hospital and sur-
geon characteristics not directly related to expected health.  θ s, h is the expected qual-
ity (gains in health) for surgeon s at hospital h. Finally,  ε i , s, h is an i.i.d. error term 
with a type-1 extreme value distribution and ρ is a vector of parameters. A patient 
selects surgeon s at hospital h if and only if  u i , s >  u i , −s ∀ −s ≠ s. Indirect utility 
in (7) is derived directly from a quasilinear utility function without wealth effects 
or prices. Prices do not enter choice because patients are generally well insured 
(55 percent by Medicare) so the out-of-pocket cost is unlikely to vary in any mean-
ingful way between surgeons.22
Information (and quality reporting) enters the model by altering beliefs about 
expected health gains from choosing a given surgeon, s. Patients are assumed to 
develop beliefs based on all available information on surgeon performance (from 
both formal and informal information sources). One important feature of patient 
choice is the likely influence of an experienced agent (the patient’s cardiologist). 
To account for the role of agency in determining demand, I include a measure of 
the patient-surgeon match assumed to be mediated through agency. This is captured 
by the deviation between a patient’s severity and the lagged average severity seen 
by surgeon s in the prior quarter (EM R i −  _ EMR s, t−1 where EMR is computed using 
the fitted values from equation (4)). Incorporating this measure into the demand 
systems assumes that patients who have more comorbidities are sicker on average 
and would benefit more from being treated by a surgeon who has the training and 
background to treat relatively sick patients. I also assume that this match value is not 
known to a patient. While he may be aware of his own severity he would not know 
the appropriate surgeon given previous patient flows. This information is, however, 
known by a referring cardiologist. Conditioning demand on agent specific informa-
tion allows patient flows to respond to reporting directly, taking potentially impor-
tant agent preferences into account, and any agent (cardiologist) response to quality 
reporting that changes preferences over patient-surgeon matching on severity.
Incorporating these features into the choice model, the expected quality if patient i 
chooses surgeon s at hospital h is
(8)   θ i , s, h = ( X i +  η i ) R C s, h .
RC is a vector of surgeon and surgeon-hospital characteristics observed by the 
patient. Included in RC is a continuous measure of surgeon performance—prior 
quarter RAMR—and dummies for discrete quality ratings included in the report card 
22 To test this assumption I estimate a specification of the choice model using data only from Medicare and 
Private fee-for-service patients (those who are known not to face any constraints on choice). This has little effect on 
first stage parameter estimates for demand or second stage estimates of surgeon response.
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(i.e., better, worse or as expected mortality based on patient severity). Substituting 
back into (7) the patient’s utility function is
(9)   u i, s, h =  X i  Z  s, h + ( X i +  η i ) R C s, h +  ε i, s, h .
Individual choice is thus a function of observed (to the econometrician) patient and 
surgeon attributes as well as unobserved factors that alter patient response to quality 
information.23 The probability that patient i chooses surgeon s at hospital h is
(10)   P i, s, h =  ∫     e  X i  Z s, h + ( X i +  η i ) R C s, h    __    ∑ 
−s∈S
 
 
  e  X i  Z −s, h + ( X i +  η i ) R C −s, h  
 ϕ ( η i | b, W ) d  η i ,
where the unobserved components of utility are distributed according to the dis-
tribution ϕ ( η i | b, W ) that is known up to a mean and covariance, b and W, to be 
estimated. Using this expression, I fit the data using simulated maximum likelihood 
(Train 2003). Estimates for the demand system are computed by solving analyti-
cally for the logit choice probabilities and integrating out the random taste distribu-
tion by taking draws from the joint distribution of unobserved terms.
Results are presented in Table 3. I estimate the model with time period interactions 
for the period before (1994–1995) and following the release of the 1998 report card, 
but prior to the release of the ensuing report cards (2000 and the first two quarters 
of 2002). The estimates are generally consistent with expectations. Travel distance 
enters choice significantly, as does surgeon quality. The effect of the introduction of 
quality reporting on demand can be seen in the interactions of the quality variables 
with the dummy for post-quality reporting. Columns 3 and 4 include controls for 
agency induced surgeon-patient matching. Because these effects are significant in 
all specifications, I include these controls in all subsequent analysis.
C. Calibrating Report Card Related Extrinsic Incentives
To calibrate the magnitude of the demand side incentives facing each surgeon, I 
simulate a series of counter-factual scenarios. Extrinsic incentives are captured by 
the measured returns to quality identified by the demand system.
The impact of information on profit is measured empirically by computing a pre-
dicted choice probability under alternate information scenarios—with and without 
quality reporting. The estimate for the report card induced change in profit is
(11) Δ Π s =  λ 1  [  ∑ 
i=1
I
   Pi, s, h, t ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω pre ) −  ∑ 
i=1
I
   Pi, s, h ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω post ) ] 
 +  λ 2  I s Dem↑ +  λ 3  I s Dem↑ ×  [ ∑ 
i=1
I
   Pi, s, h, t ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω pre ) 
 −  ∑ 
i=1
I
   Pi, s, h ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω post ) ] +  I hrr ,
23 Contained in such unobserved influences are agency, insurance network constraints, and patient-surgeon 
matching.
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where  ∑ i=1 I   Pi, s, h ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω RC ) is the sum of the fitted choice probabilities for 
all patients i receiving surgery in the HRR in which surgeon s practiced in period t, 
a measure of expected demand.  Ω RC indexes the information environment (pre- or 
post-report cards) that defines the consumer utility parameters.  I s Dem↑ is a dummy 
variable equal to one if surgeon s has an expected demand using post-reporting 
demand parameters that is greater than expected volume using pre-report card 
demand (a windfall profit from quality reporting).24 Including  I s Dem↑ and interact-
ing it with the change in predicted volume allows the model to flexibly capture 
potentially discontinuous changes in incentives at a surgeon’s current volume due 
to income effects (an issue discussed in more detail below). I also include market 
fixed effects to control for all time invariant market level factors that influence the 
profitability of quality. In this model, differences in the profitability of quality for 
surgeons are identified by differences in geographic locations, the distribution of 
patients’ tastes, the competitive structure of the market, and (in models without a 
control for 1994–1995 RAMR) baseline quality. For example, a surgeon who is at a 
low quality level in the pre-reporting period and faces few high quality competitors 
24 The difference in volume is measured with respect to the predicted volume pre-quality reporting. Surgeons 
expecting to gain volume after quality reporting ( I s Dem↑  = 1) have negative estimates for the volume difference 
 ( ∑ 
i=1 
I
   Pi, s, h, t ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω pre ) −  ∑ i=1 
I
   Pi, s, h ( X i t,  Z s, h t ,  θ s, t |  Ω post ) < 0 ) .
Table 3—Demand System Parameter Estimates
log probability patient i selects surgeon s
Mean SD Mean SD
Mean surgeon RAMR s, t−1 −0.001     (0.002) −0.001     (0.003) −0.001     (0.002) 0.000     (0.003)
Mean surgeon RAMR s, t−1  
 × post RC
−0.008**   (0.004) −0.001     (0.008) −0.008**   (0.004) −0.001     (0.008)
Distance (miles) i, s −0.216***  (0.006) 0.014     (0.011) −0.212***  (0.006) −0.007     (0.005)
Distance (miles) i, s × post RC 0.072***  (0.010) 0.007     (0.013) 0.073***  (0.010) −0.004     (0.008)
Distance squared (miles) i, s −0.001***  (0.000) 0.005***  (0.000) −0.001***  (0.000) 0.005***  (0.000)
Distance squared (miles) i, s × post RC −0.002***  (0.000) 0.000*    (0.000) −0.002***  (0.000) 0.000     (0.000)
EMR i−EMR s, t−1 1.084**   (0.516) 0.092     (0.886)
EMR i−EMR s, t−1 × post RC −3.616***  (1.173) 0.208     (2.145)
EMR i−EMR s, t−12 −17.322***  (3.483) −0.308     (4.919)
EMR i−EMR s, t−12 × post RC −17.107*    (9.839) −5.032    (14.717)
Low quality RC score 1994–1995 s −1.059***  (0.121) 1.540***  (0.154) −0.499***  (0.075) 0.601***  (0.188)
Low quality RC score 1994–1995 s  
 × post RC −0.165*    (0.087) 0.238     (0.225) −0.002     (0.068) −0.046     (0.238)
High quality RC score 1994–1995 s 0.283***  (0.024) 0.017     (0.112) 0.271***  (0.024) −0.033     (0.095)
High quality RC score 1994–1995 s  
 × post RC −0.130     (0.105) 0.277     (0.511) −0.097*    (0.055) −0.087     (0.377)
Not in report card 1994–1995 s 0.137***  (0.023) 0.043     (0.091) 0.131***  (0.023) 0.022     (0.090)
Not in report card 1994–1995 s  
 × post RC 0.079*    (0.042) 0.064     (0.192) 0.067     (0.049) 0.193     (0.243)
Observations 720,364 720,364
log likelihood −86606.20 −86570.20
Sample 1994–1995, 2000, 2002 (Q1–2) 1994–1995, 2000, 2002 (Q1–2)
Notes: Distance is computed from the center of patients’ zip codes to the hospital at which the surgeon performed sur-
gery. EMR s, t−1 is the mean expected mortality rate (severity) of patients treated by surgeon s in the prior quarter. 
EMR i − EMR s, t−1 is the absolute value of the difference. Post RC takes a value of 1 if period t is in the post-report card 
period (2000, 2002 (Q1–2)). Low and High quality scores are dummy variables for surgeons who were flagged as hav-
ing higher (lower) mortality than expected. Not in report cards takes a value of 1 for surgeons not included in the quality 
report card.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and patients who (given their locations and attributes) respond strongly to quality 
reporting has a greater return to improving performance.
Surgeon response to pecuniary rewards for quality depends on the strength of 
income and substitution effects (McGuire and Pauly 1991). If income effects domi-
nate, reductions in demand at a surgeon’s current level of quality should alter extrin-
sic incentives more than the opportunity to gain additional patients by improving 
performance. Losing volume (profit) increases the marginal utility of an additional 
patient, mediated through the marginal utility of income.25 On the other hand, if 
income effects are not sufficiently strong, demand side incentives are better mea-
sured by computing the ceteris paribus returns to a reduction in RAMR. Equation (11) 
models both effects by allowing incentives to differ for surgeons expecting to gain 
and expecting to lose patients after quality reporting (captured by the coefficients 
λ 2 and  λ 3 ).
Using the approach in (11) and the full first stage demand system (including 
agency controls), the sample mean predicted quarterly change in volume is 0.14 
with a standard deviation of 3.09. The small average effect (statistically indistin-
guishable from zero) is offset by a large variance across surgeons. Figure 6 plots the 
frequency of quarterly differences between surgeons’ pre- and post-report card pre-
dicted volumes. Breaking the impact down by positive and negative demand effects, 
the mean predicted change in demand is 1.3 patients for surgeons losing volume in 
a given quarter, and a gain of 2.5 patients for surgeons gaining volume. Compared 
to the average quarterly volume of 30 surgeries in the sample, these effects are eco-
nomically significant.
To put the financial returns in perspective, Huckman (2006) finds that the mar-
ginal profit from a CABG surgery is $6,900.26 Thus, surgeons facing the average 
decline in demand expected a reduction in annual profit ( joint with the hospital at 
which they practice) of $35,000 and surgeons gaining volume expected an annual 
profit increase of $69,000. To get an idea of the share of this profit that might accrue 
to a surgeon, we can compare the total profit to the Medicare fees provided to sur-
geons performing a single CABG (the dollar converted Relative Value Units asso-
ciated with CABG with a single arterial bypass). The surgeon fee was $2,126 in 
1994, $2,359 in 1995, and $2,009 in 2000 (Federal Register 1993; 1994; 1999).27 
Comparing these fees to the estimated marginal profit suggests that surgeons retained 
roughly one third of the profits associated with an additional CABG procedure in 
direct compensation.28
D. Mixed Incentives and Quality Improvement
Using this measure of profit incentives and the information contained in the risk 
adjustment, I estimate equation (6). The coefficients λ and  ξ n capture the effect of a 
25 The extreme version of this argument is consistent with the classic target income hypothesis (see McGuire 
2000 for a review of a long literature).
26 This is computed using data from New York and is a measure of total marginal profit to the hospital and the 
surgeon. Average profit is $2,000 for a Medicare beneficiary and $3,900 across all payer types.
27 I thank Josh Gottlieb for sharing the CABG specific RVU fees.
28 If the freelance surgeon bills the patient directly in addition to the estimated marginal profit the full fee would 
go directly to the surgeon in addition to the profit to the hospital. In this case, the share of the marginal profit would 
be roughly 24 percent (= 2,200/9,100). In both cases, the marginal incentives are substantial.
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change in profit and a change in information respectively on the change in surgeon 
RAMR between 1994–1995 and 2000. I account for measurement error from the 
first stage demand estimates by using bootstrap simulation to compute the standard 
errors. Table 4 presents results.
Parameter estimates for  ξ n are negative for all surgeon information groups. The 
effects are large and significant for information groups 1 and 2 (surgeons learning 
their performance was lower than expected). I fail to reject the hypothesis  H 0 —
that information increased intrinsic incentives for quality—for surgeons in groups 1 
and 2. Interpreting the coefficient estimates in Table 5 suggests that, after control-
ling for demand side incentives and mean reversion, surgeons who learn signifi-
cantly more about their own quality, and that of their peers, and find that they are 
not performing as well as expected (group 1), improve quality by an average of 0.57 
to 0.62 percentage points more than surgeons receiving no information from report-
ing. In columns 1 and 3, those without controls for 1994–1995 RAMR, the impact 
of learning is much larger for the same group, around 2.5 percentage points. The 
same learning, but for those only slightly worse than expected, produced an average 
improvement of between 0.71 and 0.68 percentage points of RAMR with and without 
market fixed effects respectively. The magnitude of the response is relatively similar 
including a control for pre-reporting quality.29 Finally, surgeons learning they were 
much better than expected improved by an average additional 1  percentage point 
29 These results are robust to alternate specifications of baseline RAMR. In unreported regressions, I allow for 
quadratic and nonparametric (quintiles) specifications of mean RAMR in 1994–1995. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged relative to a linear control.
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compared to surgeons gaining no new information, though this effect is ameliorated 
by including pre-reporting average RAMR.
I next turn to the estimates of the λ coefficients that capture surgeon response 
to profit incentives. Profit incentives enter with the “right” sign—surgeons facing 
more responsive patients improve quality by more. The coefficient estimates of  λ 1 
suggest that for every additional patient a surgeon expected to lose per quarter under 
quality reporting (given ex ante surgeon, competitor, and consumer characteristics) 
they reduced RAMR by an average of 0.04 to 0.01 additional percentage points. 
Estimates of  λ 2 are insignificant, suggesting that the response does not drop dis-
continuously when surgeons expect to maintain their pre-report card volume (e.g., 
income effects are relatively small). Consistent with a stronger substitution effect, 
surgeons expecting to gain patients are also observed to respond to greater report 
card-induced demand response. This can be seen in the significant estimates of 
λ 3 across all specifications. In Table 5, the extrinsic response effects are similar 
even after controlling for baseline quality, suggesting the differences are driven by 
surgeons responding to patients who are more quality elastic, not merely by the 
mechanical relationship between current quality and demand. Overall, surgeons 
Table 4—Effect of Report Card Induced Information and Demand on Surgeon Quality
Change RAMR s 1994–1995 to 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intrinsic incentives
 1994–1995 report card info  
  (RAMR-OMR) group
  Much better than expected  
   (0–20%) −1.016**   (0.407) −0.213     (0.350) −0.988***  (0.345) −0.198     (0.286)
  Slightly better than expected  
   (20–40%) −0.332     (0.334) −0.241     (0.320) −0.417     (0.374) −0.305     (0.302)
  Slightly worse than expected  
   (60–80%) −0.855***  (0.304) −0.709**   (0.280) −0.854***  (0.292) −0.681**   (0.288)
  Much worse than expected  
   (80–100%) −2.460***  (0.373) −0.827**   (0.385) −2.672***  (0.391) −0.923***  (0.343)
Extrinsic incentives
 Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC −0.037     (0.028) −0.015     (0.035) −0.023     (0.039) −0.007     (0.030)
 Increased demand with  
  RC (I [RCDem > 0]) 0.262     (0.190) 0.066     (0.161) 0.279     (0.202) 0.084     (0.183)
 I [RCDem > 0] × Pred Vol  
  No RC − Pred Vol RC
−0.137**   (0.063) −0.150**   (0.067) −0.118*    (0.070) −0.143**   (0.071)
Controls
 Mean RAMR 1994–1995 −0.695***  (0.068) −0.699***  (0.057)
 Surgeon license year (PA) 0.287***  (0.087) 0.292***  (0.067) 0.288***  (0.090) 0.294***  (0.073)
 Surgeon license year (PA)2 −0.007***  (0.002) −0.006***  (0.001) −0.007***  (0.002) −0.006***  (0.002)
 Publications 0.221***  (0.067) 0.175***  (0.074) 0.226***  (0.066) 0.180***  (0.063)
Market fixed effects? No No Yes Yes
Observations (surgeon/quarter) 1,572 1,572 1,572 1,572
R2 0.1729 0.3491 0.1896 0.3641
Notes: Observations are at the surgeon quarter level. Changes in RAMR are computed such that negative coeffi-
cient represent lower mortality (improvements in quality). Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC is positive for surgeons 
who expect to lose volume due to reporting. For surgeons who expect to gain volume, the difference in volume is 
multiplied by −1 so positive values represent quality improvements. I[RCDem > 0] if equal a dummy equal to 1 
for surgeons expecting increased volume with report cards. Block bootstrap standard errors clustered at the surgeon 
year level in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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expecting to gain more patients due to quality reporting improve by more, regard-
less of their current volume.
IV. Discussion
A. Comparing Intrinsic and Extrinsic Response to Quality Reporting
The evidence thus far is consistent with a role for both extrinsic and intrinsic 
incentives in determining surgeons’ response to quality reporting. I use the esti-
mates from equation (6) to calibrate the relative magnitudes of these incentives by 
fitting the model under alternative incentive scenarios (i.e., with and without extrin-
sic and intrinsic incentives). For brevity, I only report results from the analysis using 
full controls (the relevant coefficient estimates are in column 4 of Table 4).
Overall, the model predicts changes in RAMR relatively well. The coefficient of 
correlation between the predicted and actual change in RAMR for each surgeon is 
0.89. The full model predicts a mean improvement of 0.64 percentage points of 
RAMR compared to the actual average of 0.72. Despite the relatively good fit, I use 
predicted improvement to compare the role of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. As 
Table 5—Effect of Report Card Induced Information and Demand on Changes in Patient Severity
Change in share of patients with specific  
comorbidities/risk adjusters 1994–1995 to 2000
“Used” risk 
adjusters
“Used” risk 
adjusters
“Unused” risk 
adjusters
“Unused” risk 
adjusters
Intrinsic incentives
 1994–1995 report card info  
  (RAMR-OMR) group
  Much better than expected (0–20%) 0.032     (0.025) 0.041*    (0.024) 0.009     (0.018) −0.014     (0.016)
  Slightly better than expected  
   (20–40%) 0.049**   (0.019) 0.050**   (0.023) −0.006     (0.019) −0.010     (0.013)
  Slightly worse than expected  
   (60–80%) 0.036*    (0.021) 0.040*    (0.022) 0.033     (0.020) 0.021     (0.013)
  Much worse than expected  
   (80–100%) 0.042**   (0.019) 0.060**   (0.029) −0.037**   (0.018) −0.082***  (0.024)
Extrinsic incentives
 Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC −0.002     (0.002) −0.002     (0.002) −0.002     (0.002) −0.002     (0.002)
 I [RCDem > 0] 0.034***  (0.009) 0.031***  (0.008) −0.007     (0.009) 0.002     (0.009)
 I [RCDem > 0] × Pred Vol  
  No RC − Pred Vol RC 
−0.006*    (0.004) −0.007     (0.004) 0.003     (0.004) 0.004     (0.004)
Controls
 Mean RAMR 1994–1995 −0.007     (0.006) 0.019**   (0.007)
 Surgeon license year (PA) 0.001     (0.007) 0.001     (0.006) 0.018***  (0.006) 0.018***  (0.004)
 Surgeon license year (PA)2 0.000     (0.000) 0.000     (0.000) 0.000***  (0.000) 0.000***  (0.000)
 Publications 0.005     (0.005) 0.004     (0.004) 0.005     (0.004) 0.007**   (0.003)
Observations (surgeon/quarter) 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590
R2 0.0353 0.0475 0.0760 0.1545
Notes: Observations are at the surgeon quarter level. Block bootstrap standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sur-
geon year level. Shares are computed on a 0 to 1 scale. Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC is positive for surgeons who expect 
to lose volume due to reporting. For surgeons who expect to gain volume, the difference in volume is multiplied by −1 so 
positive (negative) values represent increases (decreases) in the share of patients with used or unused observables. “Used” 
risk adjusters are those patient characteristics included in the final risk adjustment in the report card that were available 
in both 1994–1995 and 2000. They include cardiogenic shock, complicated hypertension, dialysis, concurrent PTCA, and 
gender. “Unused” observables are patient characteristics that were gathered in 1994–1995 and 2000 but not used in the risk 
adjustment scheme for the report card. They include cardiomyopathy, diabetes, and race.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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long as the error is not correlated with the intrinsic or extrinsic incentive measures, 
the predicted changes are consistent.
I begin by computing the predicted change in quality had report cards not been 
implemented. Constraining λ = 0 and  ξ n =  ξ 3 the average predicted change in 
RAMR between 1994–1995 and 2000 is 0.07 percentage points. Allowing for extrin-
sic incentives only (incorporating λ and continuing to set  ξ n =  ξ 3 ), the predicted 
quality improvement is 0.19 percentage points of RAMR. Surgeons’ response to 
profit incentives led to an additional decline in RAMR of 0.12 (= 0.19 − 0.07) per-
centage points. Compared to the mean statewide RAMR in 1994–1995 (3.42 per-
cent), this constitutes an additional 3.5 percent decline in mortality.
Allowing only information-induced intrinsic incentives to enter the model (i.e., 
setting λ = 0) the model predicts a market wide average RAMR that is an average 
of 0.52 percentage points lower due to quality reporting. The intrinsic response to 
quality reporting alone led to an additional 0.45 (= 0.52 − 0.07) percentage point 
decline in RAMR, or 13 percent lower statewide RAMR. Comparing the two effects, 
the incremental impact of quality reporting mediated through intrinsic response is 
roughly four times as large as the response to profit incentives. Taken together, it 
is clear that report cards had an important role in quality improvement for CABG 
surgery in Pennsylvania. The bulk of that impact, though, is driven by information 
observed by surgeons and not by incentives generated by consumer response to 
reporting.
B. Incentives for Selecting Healthier Patients
A concern in any effort to measure performance is the potential for efforts to game 
the rating system. This has been widely discussed in the context of quality report-
ing in health care generally and in CABG surgery specifically (e.g., Dranove et al. 
2003), raising the question of whether the results in this paper reflect patient selec-
tion rather than true quality improvement. This section focuses on understanding 
whether the observed improvements following quality reporting can be explained 
by selection efforts by surgeons.
The detailed data on underlying patient characteristics allow me to address the 
question of selection directly as a potential explanation for the observed quality 
improvement in Table 4. To do so, I rely on a test that is similar to the test for 
selection in insurance markets using “unused observables” (Finkelstein and Poterba 
2006). Specifically, I model changes in surgeon’s share of patients with risk fac-
tors that were used to model patient severity (“used” patient observables) as well 
as candidate variables for risk adjustment that were gathered but not used in the 
final model (“unused” patient observables). That is, the PHC4 data contain a set 
of patient comorbidites that were thought at the outset to be correlated with mor-
tality, but were not ultimately used because they were found not to be sufficiently 
predictive.30 If surgeons were selecting on patient characteristics that they believed 
30 The unused observables in 1994–1995 and 2000 include whether a patient had cardiomyopathy, diabetes, 
COPD, or peripheral vascular disease as well as race and obesity. Unfortunately, data on peripheral vascular disease, 
obesity, and COPD were not collected in the 1994–1995 data. Thus, the variables used in computing patient shares 
with “unused” observables are based on cardiomyopathy, diabetes, and race.
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were correlated with risk but not captured by risk adjustment these are precisely the 
measures we would expect to change for surgeons whose RAMR declined due to 
seeing healthier patients. To do so, I estimate a variant of equation (6) that replaces 
the dependent variable with the change in share of patients treated by surgeon s who 
had at least one comorbidity r between the pre- and post-reporting periods. The 
estimating equation of interest is thus
(12)  ΔShar e s, r = α + λΔ Π s +  μ n  ∑ 
n=1
5
  I n, s (RAM R pre − OM R pre ) 
 +  X s +  X h +  ε s, h ,
where the independent variables are as in equation (6). The null hypothesis 
 H 0 :  ξ n =  ξ 3 is a test that the groups observed to improve due to intrinsic incentives 
did not differentially change the observable or unobservable severity of patients, 
they treated depending on the outcome variable. Similarly, we expect the coefficient 
λ to equal zero if differences in profit incentives did not lead surgeons to differen-
tially change the composition of patients they treated.31
The results are presented in Table 5. The left two columns present results from 
estimating equation (12) using the share of patients with at least one comorbidity 
used to risk adjust CABG outcomes. The coefficients on the measures of new infor-
mation due to reporting that drive intrinsic incentives are positive for all measures 
of new information. Depending on the specification, the coefficient estimates for  ξ n 
are statistically significant different from zero. This suggests that, if anything, sur-
geons who had more new information from reporting saw measurably more severe 
patients. The coefficient estimates of  λ 2 and  λ 3 (the impact of facing larger extrin-
sic incentives) are statistically significant. The coefficient on the dummy variable 
for facing higher demand with quality reporting is 0.034 with and 0.031 without 
controlling for baseline RAMR, suggesting that surgeons who stood to gain patient 
volume from quality reporting differentially saw more severe patients after report 
cards were released. This effect is declining in the magnitude of the expected gain 
in market share. The estimates of  λ 3 are −0.006 and −0.007, depending on the 
specification, though only the estimate in column 1 is significant at conventional 
levels. Thus, for every additional patient expected surgeons gaining market share 
actually lowered the share of patients with an observable risk adjuster. Recall that 
the average surgeon gaining patients expected to increase volume by 2.5 surger-
ies per quarter. Scaling the  λ 3 coefficients by 2.5, the net effect for the average 
surgeon expecting to gain volume on the change in the share of patients with an 
observable risk adjuster is a reduction in share of 1.9 (= 0.034 − (2.5 × 0.006)) 
to 1.3 (= 0.031 − (2.5 × 0.007)) percentage points. In the pre-reporting period the 
average share of patients with at least one observable risk adjuster for surgeons 
who stood to gain volume was 48 percent. Thus, the differential change in share of 
31 One thing to note is that this is not a test for the existence of any selection due to quality reporting overall. 
Rather, this test asks whether the main results in the paper (those in Table 5) can be explained by selection. If the 
entire market is shifting the types of patients receiving CABG due to selection incentives but surgeons with differ-
ing incentives do not do so differentially we will not find evidence for selection in this test.
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patients with at least one risk adjuster for surgeons expecting to gain volume due to 
reporting was a decline of 2.7 to 4 percent.32
The right half of Table 5 extends the analysis to test not only for changes in the 
observable risk adjusters—where the risk adjustment scheme should mitigate selec-
tion incentives—but also for changes in the share of patients with “unused” risk 
adjusters. If surgeons have the ability to select patients who are healthier in unob-
servable (to the regulatory) ways, we expect to see changes in the share of patients 
with these comorbidities for those surgeons who improved performance due to either 
extrinsic or intrinsic incentives. The majority of coefficient estimates are small and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the improvements in quality observed are 
not due to significant changes in patient severity not included in risk adjustment. 
There are, however, some significant effects. Specifically, it appears that surgeons 
learning their performance was much worse than expected saw significantly fewer 
patients with at least one “unused” risk adjuster. The coefficient estimates of −0.037 
and −0.082 with and without controls for baseline RAMR are both statistically and 
economically significant in terms of patient composition. Comparing this to the sur-
geon average of 31 percent of patients with at least one unused risk adjuster in 
1994–1995 suggests this group saw a reduction of between 12 and 26 percent in the 
number of patients with an unused risk adjuster.
These results suggest efforts to select patients, one potential channel through 
which this group of surgeons improved performance. Incorporating the actual con-
tribution of these measures of severity to outcomes, however, suggests that this 
large shift in patients was unlikely to explain the improvement in quality found in 
Section IVB. In Appendix A1, I replicate the PHC4 risk adjustment model with and 
without “unused” risk adjusters. These results make clear that the marginal contri-
bution of avoiding a patient with any of the unused risk adjusters had a far smaller 
impact on expected mortality than the used risk adjusters and was unlikely to mate-
rially affect RAMR. Appendix Table A1 presents the model used in the 1994–1995 
risk adjustment model. The fourth column presents the marginal effects of the full 
model with both used and unused risk adjusters. The unused risk adjusters are all 
an order of magnitude smaller than the used risk measures and none are statisti-
cally significant. If we take the upper bound on the marginal effect of any of the 
unused risk adjusters, a 0.6 percentage point increase in the probability of inpatient 
mortality for patients with cardiomyopathy, a reduction of 8 percentage points in 
the share of patients with this risk adjuster would translate to a reduction in RAMR 
of 0.05 percentage points. Compared to the estimated differential improvement of 
this group of surgeons of 0.92 percentage points (column 4 of Table 4), selection 
can only explain 5 percent of the observed improvement due to intrinsic incentives. 
Furthermore, this is a conservative estimate as the impact of cardiomyopathy is 
approximately six times larger than the marginal impact of the other unused risk 
32 In an additional specification (not reported), I reestimate the same model using only the share of patients with 
cardiogenic shock as the dependent variable. Conversations with CABG surgeons suggests they believe this is a key 
factor that would make a patient more difficult and, therefore, a characteristic that we would expect to see avoided 
if possible. The coefficient estimates for intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are not significantly different from zero.
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adjusters, and it is unlikely the full share of patients who shifted away from surgeons 
learning they were worse than expected had this comorbidity.33
Taken together, these results suggest that surgeons with differing intrinsic incen-
tives to improve quality do not appear to have accomplished reductions in mortality 
by changing their patient mix either based on observable or unobservable (to the 
regulator) patient severity. It does, however, appear that surgeons learning they were 
performing poorly did try to select unobservably healthier patients. Despite this, 
the actual contribution of this selection to quality improvement was negligible. If 
anything, this finding suggests selection could be an issue, but the risk adjustment 
scheme employed by PHC4 was sufficient to account for measures that can contrib-
ute significantly to mortality risk.
C. Long Run/Dynamic Pecuniary Incentives
Perhaps the most relevant threat to the validity of the model is the potential for 
dynamic pecuniary returns to quality improvement. If current period investments 
are related to future demand, what we are calling intrinsic incentives may in fact 
be quality improvement in response to expected future compensation. To provide 
a simple test for such long run pecuniary incentives, I assume that surgeons make 
decisions based on rational expectations of future returns to quality improvements.34 
I estimate the following model:
(13)  q s, t = α +  γ 1 Δ θ s, t−y, t−n +  γ 2  q s, t−z +  γ 3  θ s, t−n +  X s +  X h +  ε s, h ,
where  q s, t is the quantity of patients seen by surgeon s in period t and Δ θ s, t−y, t−n is 
the change in surgeon quality between period t − n and t − y. z, n, and y are posi-
tive integers satisfying: n > y. Including the quantity of surgeries by surgeon s in 
all periods, t − z controls for the full stock of demand and quality effects prior to 
period t. Because I am primarily interested in surgeons’ response to quality reporting 
introduced in 1998, I estimate (13) using surgeon volume in 2003 as the dependent 
variable and measure the change in quality as the difference between a surgeon’s 
1994–1995 and 2000 RAMR. I control for baseline quality and surgeon volume in 
1994, 1995, 2000, and 2002.
The estimated coefficient on Δ θ s, 2000, 1994–1995 is −1.98 (s.e. = 1.52). The nega-
tive and statistically insignificant estimate suggests that surgeons were unlikely to 
expect changes in quality to produce pecuniary returns in the future. If anything, it 
appears that greater quality improvement led to a slightly smaller number of patients 
in the long run. I also estimate (12) with the change in quality between 1994 and 
1995 as an independent variable. The estimated coefficient on Δ θ s, 1995, 1994 is 0.43 (s.e. = 0.6), again an insignificant effect of the change in quality on subsequent 
33 Table A2 presents a similar risk adjustment model with and without unused risk adjusters using data from the 
post-report card period. The coefficient estimates for the unused risk adjusters remain largely the same with only 
the estimate for diabetes without complications changing. Since the marginal effect for this unused risk adjuster 
was actually to make patients less severe, avoiding those patients would not explain the observed improvement.
34 This is a simplifying assumption, though standard in traditional models of incentives and investment. However, 
models that incorporate risk or ambiguity aversion are not being tested directly in equation (13). Appendix A3 dis-
cusses the different incentives, both extrinsic and intrinsic, that could be at play and the identifying variation and 
assumptions for each.
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annual volume; in this case eight years hence. These results are consistent with 
Johnson (2010) who studies the impacts of market learning (as opposed to report 
card-based) about quality among cardiac surgeons on their career paths over time. 
She also finds no impact of quality (measured by mortality) on long run surgery 
volume in the Medicare market.
It is also plausible that the performance improvements do not change patient 
volume, but allow surgeons to gain more patients whose insurance provides better 
remuneration through surgical fees for CABG. The detailed data on patients’ insur-
ance allows us to test for this directly by estimating another variant of equation (13). 
I find little evidence for changes in payor share as a result of quality improvements. 
For brevity, results are presented in Appendix A2.
D. Local Peers and Learning
I turn next to a sensitivity test for the specific model that information alters sur-
geons’ behavior by altering their knowledge about a reference group. The base 
specification (equation (6)) models surgeons’ learning using the risk adjustment 
based on statewide performance. If surgeon incentives are related to their knowl-
edge about the performance of their peers I also expect that new learning about 
other peer groups will alter the intrinsic incentives. The most easily defined peer 
group is the set of other surgeons practicing at the same hospital. To test for an effect 
of learning about within-hospital peer performance, I reestimate (6) and include a 
measure of the difference between surgeon s’ RAMR in the pre-reporting period and 
the top (lowest RAMR) and bottom (highest RAMR) surgeon at the hospital at which 
they practiced in 1994–1995. The model is
(14) Δ θ s = α + λΔ Π s +  ξ n  ∑ 
n=1
5
  I n, s (RAM R pre − OM R pre ) 
 + η (RAM R pre − min RAM R h, s, pre ) + μ (RAM R pre − max RAM R h, s, pre ) 
 +  X s +  X h +  ε s, h .
Results are presented in Table 6 for models including baseline RAMR, with and 
without market fixed effects.
In both models, coefficient estimates for both η and μ are negative and significant, 
suggesting a surgeon learning he is further from either the best—opportunity to 
improve—or the worst surgeon at his hospital improves RAMR by relatively more. 
These results support the earlier findings, that report card learning alters incentives 
by improving knowledge about a reference group. Moreover, adding these controls 
produces larger coefficient estimates for suggesting that surgeons compare perfor-
mance both to their peers at their own hospital and to the full statewide population.
V. Conclusion
The impact of information on equilibrium quality is mediated through demand 
insofar as suppliers choose quality levels to maximize profit. In this paper, I  present 
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an alternate model in which reference intrinsic utility also determines surgeons’ 
willingness to make costly quality improvements. Information (quality reporting) 
alters a surgeon’s beliefs about their own quality level relative to a reference set of 
peers. If intrinsically motivated suppliers update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, 
the improved posterior beliefs alter the shape of the intrinsic utility function and 
thus a surgeon’s marginal incentive to improve quality.
The risk-adjustment model that underlies quality report cards provides a sim-
ple way of identifying the magnitude of the new information provided to surgeons 
and its effect on performance. Surgeons who gain more information about their 
performance relative to their peers (from risk adjustment) improve significantly 
more. A structural patient choice model allows me to estimate the profit incentives 
from quality reporting. Conditioning on extrinsic incentives, the intrinsic response 
to information leads to significant declines in RAMR and is large relative to the 
response to profit motives. Improvements cannot be explained by surgeon efforts to 
shift the composition of the patients they treat, either on observable risk measures 
used in risk adjustment or on “unused” observables that could be used to game the 
quality measure.
Table 6—Effect of Report Card Induced Information and Demand on Surgeon Quality  
Including Learning about within Hospital Reference Surgeons
Change RAMR s 1994–1995 to 20001
(1) (2)
Intrinsic incentives
 1994–1995 report card info (RAMR-OMR) spline
  Much better than expected (0–20%) −0.360     (0.314) −0.362     (0.278)
  Slightly better than expected (20–40%) −0.346     (0.308) −0.396     (0.286)
  Slightly worse than expected (60–80%) −0.632**   (0.263) −0.646**   (0.250)
  Much worse than expected (80–100%) −0.961***  (0.304) −1.007***  (0.339)
  RAMR s − Best RAMR h −0.313**   (0.136) −0.310**   (0.129)
  RAMR s − Worst RAMR h −0.041***  (0.008) −0.038***  (0.008)
Extrinsic incentives
 Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC −0.040     (0.043) −0.039     (0.037)
 Increased demand with RC (I [RCDem > 0]) 0.233     (0.191) 0.221     (0.172)
 I [RCDem>0] × Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC −0.004     (0.067) −0.013     (0.057)
Controls
 Mean RAMR 1994–1995 −0.406***  (0.152) −0.417***  (0.134)
 Surgeon license year (PA) 0.249***  (0.075) 0.259***  (0.076)
 Surgeon license year (PA)2 −0.005***  (0.002) −0.005***  (0.002)
 Publications 0.145**   (0.062) 0.148***  (0.056)
 Publications2 −0.007***  (0.002) −0.007***  (0.002)
Market fixed effects? No Yes
Observations (surgeon/quarter) 1,572 1,572
R2 0.3830 0.3873
Notes: Observations are at the surgeon quarter level. Block bootstrap standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
at the surgeon year level. Changes in RAMR are computed such that negative coefficient represent lower mortal-
ity (improvements in quality). Pred Vol No RC − Pred Vol RC is positive for surgeons who expect to lose volume 
due to reporting. For surgeons who expect to gain volume, the difference in volume is multiplied by −1 so posi-
tive values represent quality improvements. I [RCDem > 0] if equal a dummy equal to 1 for surgeons expecting 
increased volume with report cards. RAMR s − Worst RAMR h multiplied by −1 so positive values represent qual-
ity improvement.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The results of this paper add to the literature on the behavioral response to 
improved information in markets. However, I note some shortcomings and direc-
tions for future work. I consider a specific setting—cardiac surgery—that may not 
generalize to other markets or professions. The field of medicine, perhaps more than 
any other, relies on not-for-profit incentives to correct market failures. As trainees, 
physicians also become accustomed to evaluation mechanisms based on relative 
performance (grades and MCAT for medical school, board scores for residency and 
licensure, etc). For these reasons, the relative magnitude of intrinsic versus extrinsic 
effects I find among cardiac surgeons may be larger than in other settings.
Nevertheless, these results provide an empirical first step and guidance on the 
potential role for mixed incentives in determining skilled professionals’ effort and 
investment. The findings also contribute to our understanding of the effects of qual-
ity reporting in health care and inform policy making in this market.
Appendix A1: Risk Adjustment Model
In this section, I replicate the risk adjustment model used by the Pennsylvania 
Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) to predict inpatient mortality fol-
lowing CABG surgery in 1994–1995. The details of the risk adjustment scheme are 
covered in PHC4 (1998). To replicate the results, I estimate a logistic regression 
following equation (4). Results are presented in Table A1. The first column presents 
coefficients for the logistic regression. The second column presents the marginal 
effects of each of the observables on the probability of inpatient mortality. The third 
and fourth columns present the same model but also incorporate the unused risk 
adjusters used in the analysis in Section IVB. In addition, I reestimate the same 
model, used in the 1994–1995 report card, using data from the year 2000. This dem-
onstrates the relative impact of the same comorbidities in the post-reporting period. 
The models are not exactly comparable as PHC4 switched from using ASG severity 
scores, coded in discrete levels between zero and four in Table A1, to using a con-
tinuous severity measure provided by Mediqual. Nevertheless, the estimates appear 
relatively similar. These results are presented in Table A2.
Appendix A2: Payer Mix and Reimbursement
In this section, I test the long run impact of quality improvement on the mix of 
insurance coverage a surgeon treats. To do so, I estimate a variant of equation (13). 
In the new specification the dependent variable is the probability a surgeon in each 
group sees a patient with insurance plan type z.
Results are presented in Table A3. Each column presents one regression in which 
changes in the share of patients seen by each surgeon in 2003 is regressed against 
improvements in quality between 1994–1995 and 2000, controlling for the payer 
shares in those earlier periods and baseline RAMR in 1994–1995. The coefficients 
on most types of coverage are small and statistically insignificant. The only changes 
in coverage type that are statistically significant are for the share being treated with 
either Medicare HMO or Medicaid. Quality improvements in earlier periods seem 
to lead to slightly larger share of Medicare HMO enrollees and a smaller share of 
Medicaid patients. These effects are, however, small in magnitude. Taken together 
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Table A1—Risk Adjustment Model Used in the 1994–1995 Report Card  
with and without “Unused Observables” Using Year 1994–1995 Observations
Inpatient mortality
logit Marginal effect logit Marginal effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ASG score 1 (d) 0.656 0.011 0.644 0.011
(1.02) (0.02) (1.02) (0.02)
ASG score 2 (d) 1.323 0.029 1.300 0.028
(1.02) (0.03) (1.02) (0.03)
ASG score 3 (d) 2.015** 0.088 1.989* 0.086
(1.02) (0.09) (1.02) (0.09)
ASG score 4 (d) 3.767*** 0.417* 3.739*** 0.409
(1.03) (0.25) (1.03) (0.25)
Age −0.061* −0.001* −0.062* −0.001*
(0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Age squared 0.066** 0.001** 0.068*** 0.001**
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Cardiogenic shock (d) 1.758*** 0.076*** 1.754*** 0.076***
(0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
Concurrent PTCA (d) 0.436*** 0.009*** 0.450*** 0.010***
(0.13) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00)
Complicated hypertension (d) 0.533*** 0.012*** 0.507*** 0.011***
(0.14) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00)
Dialysis (d) 1.814*** 0.081*** 1.799*** 0.079***
(0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
Female (d) 0.448*** 0.009*** 0.436*** 0.008***
(0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
Heart failure (d) 0.797*** 0.018*** 0.778*** 0.018***
(0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Prior CABG or valve surgery (d) 1.294*** 0.041*** 1.299*** 0.041***
(0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Non-white (d) 0.066 0.001
(0.11) (0.00)
Diabetes without complications (d) 0.068 0.001
(0.07) (0.00)
Diabetes with complications (d) 0.124 0.002
(0.13) (0.00)
Cardiomyopathy (d) 0.316* 0.006
(0.18) (0.00)
Observations 38,656 38,656 38,656 38,656
Notes: Includes all observations from 1994–1995. logit models present coefficients estimates from a logistic regres-
sions with inpatient mortality as the outcome variable. Even numbered columns present marginal impact of each 
risk adjuster on the probability of inpatient mortality. ASG risk scores are supplied by PHC4 directly. (d) for dis-
crete change of dummy variable from zero to one.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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these results do not suggest substantial long run impacts on insurance composition 
for those surgeons who improved quality between 1994–1995 and 2000.
Appendix A3: Types of Incentives and Identification
The approach taken both in the theoretical and empirical model of intrinsic 
response to quality reporting is relatively general. Both focus on identifying and 
separating the response of surgeons to new information that is unrelated to changes 
in patient demand from the change due to changes in patient demand. Underlying 
Table A2—Risk Adjustment Model Used in the 1994–1995 Report Card  
with and without “Unused Observables” Using Year 2000 Observations
Inpatient mortality 
logit Marginal effect logit Marginal effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MediQual CABG severity 6.993*** 0.152*** 6.875*** 0.148***
(0.53) (0.01) (0.53) (0.01)
Age 0.011 0.000 0.021 0.000
(0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cardiogenic shock (d) 2.006*** 0.121*** 1.991*** 0.118***
(0.20) (0.02) (0.20) (0.02)
Concurrent PTCA (d) 0.264 0.007 0.281 0.007
(0.32) (0.01) (0.32) (0.01)
Complicated hypertension (d) 0.333** 0.008* 0.314** 0.008*
(0.15) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00)
Dialysis (d) 1.621*** 0.080*** 1.610*** 0.078***
(0.18) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02)
Female (d) 0.223*** 0.005*** 0.245*** 0.006***
(0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Heart failure (d) 0.807*** 0.022*** 0.805*** 0.022***
(0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Prior CABG or valve surgery (d) 0.296** 0.007* 0.304** 0.007**
(0.14) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00)
Non-white (d) 0.175* 0.004*
(0.10) (0.00)
Diabetes without complications (d) −0.325*** −0.007***
(0.10) (0.00)
Diabetes with complications (d) −0.031 −0.001
(0.15) (0.00)
Cardiomyopathy (d) 0.225 0.005
(0.20) (0.01)
Observations 22,856 22,856 22,856 22,856
Notes: Includes all observations from 2000. logit models present coefficients estimates from a logistic regres-
sions with inpatient mortality as the outcome variable. Even numbered columns present marginal impact of each 
risk adjuster on the probability of inpatient mortality. Risk adjustment model based on the model used by PHC4 in 
1994–1995 but includes a continuous measure of severity, “MediQual CABG Severity” score, instead of the ASG 
score. The severity score replaced the discrete ASG scores in data provided by PHC4. (d) for discrete change of 
dummy variable from 0 to 1.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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this general question, different components enter into intrinsic and extrinsic incen-
tives in theory. Those components are identified with different sources of variation 
and assumptions. To help clarify each of these components, Table A4 enumerates 
each of the features that enter into extrinsic (column 1) and intrinsic (column 3) 
motivation in the surgeon setting. Columns 2 and 4 then present a summary of the 
key identifying assumptions and variation for each of these features.
Table A3—Effect of Changes in Quality on Long Run (2003) Payor Mix
Share of patients with payor type 2003
Private FFS
Private 
managed care Medicare FFS Medicare HMO Medicaid Uninsured
Change RAMR  
 1994–1995 to 2000 
−0.001    (0.001) 0.002  (0.001) −0.002  (0.002) 0.003**   (0.001)−0.001*   (0.001) 0.000  (0.000)
Share payor type  
 1994–1995 
0.202    (0.131) −0.133  (0.162) 0.267  (0.195) 0.244     (0.186) 0.478**  (0.220) −0.003  (0.038)
Share payor type  
 2000 
0.254**  (0.124) 0.334  (0.244) 0.109  (0.235) 1.211***  (0.379) 0.143    (0.245) 0.009  (0.204)
Mean RAMR  
 1994–1995 
0.000    (0.001) 0.000  (0.002) −0.004  (0.003) 0.000     (0.002) 0.002**  (0.001) 0.000  (0.000)
Observations  
 (surgeon/quarter)
1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242
R2 0.102 0.022 0.060 0.173 0.064 0.003
Notes: Observations are at the surgeon quarter level. Bootstrap standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
surgeon level. Shares are computed on a 0 to 1 scale. Each column is the change in share for the payor type listed 
in the header in 2003.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A4—Components of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Incentives and Identification
Extrinsic Identification Intrinsic Identification
Profit Change in volume with and 
without quality reporting
given market structure.
Assume CABG is profitable
on average and at the margin.
Performance
relative to peers
Difference between prior beliefs 
(OMR) and information on 
average peers’ performance had 
they treated the same patients 
(RAMR). Assume surgeons 
do not know RAMR perfectly.
Long run
profit
Relationship between RAMR 
change from 1994–1995 to 2000 
and 1994 to 1995 and change in 
volume and payor mix in 2003. 
Condition on short run changes 
due to the release of report 
cards.
Ability to observe
performance  
relative to peers
Release of report cards with 
information. Assume 
performance of peers, given 
the set of patients they treat, 
is imperfectly observed. 
Specification check controls 
for local peer performance. 
Risk aversion Compare surgeons expecting 
to gain volume to those 
expecting to lose volume.
Beliefs about
long run
incentives
Assume rational expectations 
among surgeons. Assume no 
long run risk or ambiguity 
aversion.
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